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TORTS
I. STRICT TORT LIABILITY IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS
In products liability actions, there is a significant modern
trend toward acceptance of the doctrine of strict liability in tort.'
In South Carolina, however, the applicability of strict tort liabil-
ity in products liability cases is ambiguous because the supreme
court has not had occasion to address this issue in recent years.
2
The federal district court in South Carolina has thus found itself
in an untenable position: it must either anticipate the supreme
court's decision in the area and involve itself in complex problems
of federal/state comity,3 or it must refuse to apply the widely
accepted doctrine of strict liability. This dilemma is illustrated
by the confusion and conflict among federal court decisions in
this jurisdiction during the past year. Before a consideration of
these decisions, the position of the South Carolina Supreme
Court should be examined.
The attitude of the South Carolina Supreme Court is best
1. The jurisdictions which have adopted the strict liability approach of section 402A
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS include the following: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missi-
ssippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin. For text of section 402A, see note 9 infra.
2. The relatively few products liability cases which have come before the South
Carolina Supreme Court have been actions based upon traditional negligence principles
rather than upon implied warranty. None has been brought on the theory of strict tort
liability. The cases of Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co., 249 S.C. 130, 153
S.E.2d 184 (1967), and Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968), both
decided on demurrers, referred to implied warranty.
3. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Brown v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., Civil No. 72-782 (D.S.C., filed Dec. 13, 1973). Judge Hemphill, in McHugh
v. Carlton, Civil No. 73-1567 at 17, n.9 (D.S.C., filed Jan. 31, 1974), stated the problem
as follows:
The question of whether South Carolina will, eventually, adopt the doctrine of
strict liability as the law of the State has given this court grave concern. Con-
vinced that South Carolina has not done so, and having no desire to preempt
South Carolina on the issue, this court has, nevertheless, discussed the question
with various members of South Carolina's trial bench, in particularly the schol-
arly judge of the Second South Carolina Circuit who favors strict liability and
whose research has been made available to this court. This court is inclined to
agree with his conclusions that strict liability is the fairest doctrine, but until
the Supreme Court of South Carolina so proclaims, under the Erie doctrine (cite
omitted), this court must accept South Carolina's failure to adopt strict liability
as governing this court's decisions on the issue of the doctrine's application to
South Carolina cases whether in state or federal court.
But see note 44 infra and accompanying text.
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indicated by the 1967 decision of Springfield v. Williams Plumb-
ing Supply Co.4 In this case the court recognized the trend toward
a more liberal approach with regard to establishing liability for
the manufacture and sale of defective products. The issue under
consideration, a novel one in this jurisdiction,' was whether an
action could be maintained on the theory of implied warranty in
the absence of privity.5 The supreme court explicitly confined its
holding to the determination that the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
allegations of breach of implied warranty were not to be decided
on demurrer. The limited nature of the holding should not, how-
ever, be taken to minimize the importance of the court's indica-
tion of its tentative "leaning" in the area of products liability.'
In discussing the recent trend toward abandoning the privity re-
quirement in products liability actions, the court acknowledged
that various theories have been advanced by courts in support of
such abandonment, and "at least some of them ' 8 were adopting
the strict liability approach of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.' The court further asserted that many judicial
decisions have recognized the need to depart from a strict require-
4. 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967).
5. The defendants appealed from a refusal of the trial judge to grant a demurrer
predicated on lack of privity. They considered Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95
S.E.2d 601 (1956), a case requiring privity in an implied warranty action, as dispositive
of the issue. The supreme court factually distinguished Odom on the ground that only
economic losses because of the failure of the tractor to perform adequately were involved,
as opposed to serious personal injuries in Springfield. This issue is now moot in light of
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-318 (Spec. Supp. 1966), which abolished the privity requirement
for implied warranty.
6. See notes 10 and 20 infra and accompanying text.
7. Although distinguishable as being brought under the Pure Food & Drug Act (see
p. 360 infra), the extent to which the supreme court went in assuming a causal connection
in Miller v. Atlantic Bottling Corp., 259 S.C. 278, 191 S.E.2d 518 (1972), a case involving
a soft drink containing deleterious matter, indicates the degree of accountability to which
the court is willing to hold a manufacturer of a "defective" product.
8. 249 S.C. at 136, 153 S.E.2d at 187.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (hereinafter section 402A) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected
to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condi-
tion in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exer-
cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the
user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller.
2
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ment of privity' in products liability cases, and that many legis-
latures, including that of South Carolina, have done so through
the adoption of various versions of the Uniform Commercial
Code." At the time of the Springfield decision the UCC had been
adopted but was not yet in effect in South Carolina. 2 Thus, the
court was understandably unwilling to construe the effect of its
applicable provisions. Another reason for its reluctance to say
more than absolutely necessary was the recognition that "the
whole field of products liability law is still in a state of flux and
development."' 3 Four years after the Springfield decision, the
Fourth Circuit in Gardner v. Q.H.S.4 described the law of prod-
ucts liability in South Carolina as an amalgam of negligence and
implied warranty. The court found the UCC implied warranty's
imposition of liability without fault to be applicable in that
case.'" The court relied on sections 388 and 395 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts in asserting that:
[Tihe law has now reached the stage of development that a
supplier and manufacturer of a chattel are liable to all whom
they should expect use the chattel or be endangered by its use
if (a) they know or have reason to know that the chattel is or is
likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, (b)
they lack reason to believe the user will realize the potential
danger, and (c) they fail to exercise reasonable care to inform
of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely
to be dangerous.'"
Both the theory of negligent failure to warn set forth above and
10. Without the requirement of privity, liability based upon implied warranty differs
very little from strict tort liability. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
11. The particularly applicable UCC provisions are found in S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-
314 and 10.2-318 (Spec. Supp. 1966). Section 10.2-314 provides an implied warranty of
merchantability for the ordinary purpose for which goods are used. Section 10.2-318, which
abolishes the requirement of privity, states:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who may be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and whose
person or property is damaged by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
See note 25 infra and accompanying text.
12. The UCC was adopted in Jan. 1966, to be effective Jan. 1, 1968. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 10.10-101 (Spec. Supp. 1966).
13. 249 S.C. at 137, 153 S.E.2d at 187.
14. 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971).
15. Specifically applicable was S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-314 (Spec. Supp. 1966), which
provides an implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for the ordinary purpose for
which goods are sold.
16. 448 F.2d at 242.
[Vol. 26
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the doctrine of implied warranty and merchantability were con-
sidered appropriate causes of action.
The Gardner court cited as persuasive Chestnut v. Ford
Motor Co.," a Fourth Circuit case arising under the law of Vir-
ginia. In Chestnut, the court found that it is primarily one ele-
ment which distinguishes negligence liability from implied war-
ranty and strict tort liabilityt -the requirement that a plaintiff
prove a defect to be the result of lack of due care by the manufac-
turer.
The standard of safety of goods imposed on the seller or manu-
facturer of a product is essentially the same whether the theory
of liability is labelled warranty or negligence or strict tort liabil-
ity: the product must not be unreasonably dangerous at the time
that it leaves the defendant's possession if employed in the man-
ner in which it was intended to be used .... 1
Thus, the Gardner court, in relying upon Chestnut, implicitly
recognized the essentially similar nature of liability predicated on
the tort theory of strict liability and liability based on the con-
tractual theory of implied warranty.
The fundamental similarity of the two theories of liability
has been repeatedly recognized, especially since the demise of the
privity requirement in implied warranty." Justice Traynor, in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,21 observed that:
17. 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971).
18. As stated by the court in Chestnut, the other major differences in the theories of
liability lie in the defenses available to each.
19. 445 F.2d at 968.
20. Although there are some distinctions in liability under section 402A and under
UCC implied warranty, the two theories are becoming increasingly similar as case law
develops in the area. Some courts have explicitly considered the two doctrines indistin-
guishable. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. .433, (1972). Others have by implication considered them equivalent. See, e.g.,
Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
As one well-known expert in the field of products liability and torts has stated, "the
action for breach of warranty (in the non-privity situation) already seems to be fading into
the action for strict liability, with the warranty terminology and legal implications being
elided." Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 850
(1973). This law review article provides an excellent analysis of the developing law of
products liability. For other articles exploring the nature of strict liability and or implied
warranty in products liability actions, see generally, e.g., Franklin, When Worlds Collide:
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STA. L. Rfv. 974
(1966); Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887 (1967); Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-
Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA.
L. REv. 804 (1965); Titus, Restatement (Second) Torts Section 402A and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713 (1970).
21. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
19741
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss2/13
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Although in [products liability] cases strict liability has
usually been based on the theory of an express or implied war-
ranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the aban-
donment of the requirement of a contract between them, the
recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but
imposed by law, and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to
define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products
make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of
contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.22
According to Justice Traynor, "[tihe remedies of injured con-
sumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of
the law of sales."23 It was noted in a recent California products
liability decision that until Greenman the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity was imposed by extension of the warranty doctrine.
24
The South Carolina legislature has effectively accomplished
imposition of strict liability through its abolition of the privity
requirement. In its adoption of the UCC, the legislature of this
state elected a version of section 2-318 which closely resembles
Alternative C, the most liberal of the alternatives with regard to
the privity requirement. According to the drafters of the UCC,
this alternative was drawn to reflect the trend of recent decisions
as indicated by section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 5 The Fourth Circuit has tacitly recognized strict tort lia-
bility to be appropriate in Grayson v. Chrysler Corp.26 and Ussery
v. Federal Laboratories, Inc. 27 Most of the federal district judges
have, nevertheless, refused to apply strict tort liability because
the South Carolina Supreme Court has not yet affirmatively rec-
ognized it to be the law of this state.
The Ussery decision provides an excellent illustration of the
confused status of strict liability as a basis for recovery in prod-
ucts liability actions in South Carolina. 8 Ussery sued Federal
22. 59 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (citations omitted).
23. Id.
24. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972).
25. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 3. It must be noted, however, that
the South Carolina version differs from Alternative C in two respects: first, it applies only
to natural persons (not to corporations); and second, it extends only to personal and
property damage (not to commercial losses). The South Carolina provision combines
aspects of Alternative B and Alternative C.
26. Civil No. 73-1099 (4th Cir., filed Sept. 14, 1973) (mem.).
27. Civil Nos. 72-1679 and 72-1680 (4th Cir., filed Dec. 19, 1973) See p. 342 infra.
28. Another interesting aspect of the case is the Fourth Circuit's reversal of the trial
judge's refusal to charge contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Judge Winter's
[Vol. 26
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Laboratories [hereinafter Federal], the manufacturer of a
"blast-type tear gas billy," for personal injuries, including com-
plete loss of sight, suffered as a result of a defective tear gas gun.
The injuries occurred while the plaintiff was an inmate in the
South Carolina Maximum Detention Retraining Center. In an
attempt to restrain the plaintiff from wrecking kitchen equip-
ment and scuffling with a prison guard, the warden fired the tear
gas billy-gun at him. The complaint asserted causes of action
based on negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability, but
the parties agreed to try the case under the theory of strict liabil-
ity.29 The jury awarded Ussery a total of $600,000, including ac-
tual damages of $175,000 and punitive damages in the amount of
$425,000. A remittitur of $75,000 was ordered by the court. Fed-
eral appealed both the refusal of the trial court to direct a verdict
and the denial of its motion to set aside the judgment, while
Ussery appealed the remittitur. A majority of the three-judge
panel held that the trial court committed reversible error in re-
jecting seven instructions proposed by Federal."0
The theory of strict liability advanced by the plaintiff was
that set forth in section 402A.3' Ussery alleged that Federal was
dissent is especially convincing in its discussion of the nature of those defenses. As he'
noted, the majority of the court simply ignored the fact that:
it is generally recognized that the plaintiff must be negligent with respect to or
assume the risk created by defendant's conduct. Failure to use care to perceive
or avoid some other risk will not bar recovery. Civil Nos. 72-1679 and 72-1680
at 30.
In accord with section 496D of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TonTs, the plaintiff does not
assume a risk of harm arising from defendant's conduct unless he knows the existence of
and understands the nature of the risk involved. A similar position with regard to contri-
butory negligence is espoused in section 468 of the RESTATEMENT. This section provides
that a plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable care for his own safety is no bar to re-
covery "unless his harm results from one of the hazards which make [sic] his conduct
negligent." In Ussery, the plaintiff did, of course, assume a risk of harm from lawful efforts
of guards to subdue him by becoming involved in an altercation. He did not, however,
assume the risk of being permanently blinded by a defectively designed tear gas gun.
29. Civil Nos. 72-1679 and 72-1680 at 2, n.1.
30. The seven rejected instructions, too lengthy to set out in full in this article,
concerned the following: (1) permissible inferences from the fact that the accident oc-
cured; (2) defendant's action as proximate cause of the injury; (3) necessity of warning;
(4) assumption of risk; (5) contributory negligence; (6) foreseeability by manufacturer of
abnormal use of product; and (7) obligation of inmate to obey prison official's disciplinary
order.
In his dissent, Judge Winter asserted that four of the proposed instructions (ios. 1,
2, 3, and 6 above) were substantially incorporated into the district court's charge, that
two were improper under the evidence of the case (Nos. 4 and 5 above), and that one (No.
7 above) was irrelevant as a matter of law.
31. See note 9 supra.
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engaged in the business of making and selling tear gas guns, that
he was a "user," and that his injury was a result of a defective
product. He also asserted, using the language of implied war-
ranty, "that the defect consisted of an unreasonable danger in the
gun for the purpose for which the defendant knew it was pur-
chased."3" The defendant set forth two defenses to the plaintiffs
cause of action: first, that the injury was not the result of a
defective product, but was in fact the result of misuse of the
product; and, secondly, that by his own conduct, the plaintiff had
contributed to the altercation and had thereby assumed the risk
of bodily injury.
Although the case was tried on the theory of strict liability,
Judge Blatt's charge was not clearly based upon that doctrine,
but rather upon the theory of South Carolina products liability
law as interpreted in Gardner v. Q.H.S.33 This writer is in agree-
ment with Judge Winter's conclusion in his dissenting opinion
that the case was submitted by the district court to the jury upon
"an ambiguous theory of defendant's liability."3 Judge Winter,
the author of the Gardner opinion, explained in his dissent that
under the Gardner test, the "theories of negligence and implied
warranty coalesce."35 Nevertheless, the majority of the court in
Ussery implicitly assumed throughout the opinion that the doc-
trine of strict liability in tort" as set forth in section 402A is
appropriate in South Carolina. In his dissent, Judge Winter noted
that both parties agreed that strict liability will be adopted by
the South Carolina Supreme Court when it has the opportunity
to do so.
Even though the Ussery decision might initially appear to
signify a recognition of the application of strict tort liability for
defective products in South Carolina, the issue is not by any
means settled. A petition for rehearing en banc has been filed
with the Fourth Circuit. Also, prior to Ussery, the Fourth Circuit
in Grayson v. Chrysler Corp.37 had rather summarily affirmed per
curiam a district judge's3" decision allowing a cause of action
32. Civil Nos. 72-1679 and 72-1680 at 4.
33. See p. 338 supra; see also Civil Nos. 72-1679 and 72-1680 at 7-8.
34. Civil Nos. 72-1679 and 72-1680 at 27 (dissenting opinion).
35. Id. at 28.
36. Id. at 2, n.1, 3, 4, 12, 13. The majority stated that "[w]ithout objection the case
was tried on the theory of strict liability" as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRS § 402A.
37. Civil No. 73-1099 (4th Cir., filed Sept. 14, 1973) (mem.).
38. Id. (Judge Blatt).
[Vol. 26
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based on what appears to have been the theory of strict liability
in tort. Even after that affirmance, at least two other district
judges39 refused to recognize the doctrine as applicable in South
Carolina. In Brown v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.," Judge Si-
mons noted the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of Grayson, but
stated that "[t]he reasoning of the Court of Appeals cannot be
determined from the short decision, and nothing therein indi-
cated that the Fourth Circuit held that South Carolina has
adopted the doctrine of strict liability."4 Just as the Grayson case
was not dispositive of the issue, neither is Ussery. The reasoning
of the majority opinion is rather ambiguous, leaving much room
for interpretation by the district judges. The fact that the ques-
tion of strict liability remains unresolved is evidenced in the Jan-
uary, 1974, decision of McHugh v. Carlton.42 In that opinion,
Judge Hemphill stated unequivocally that "[u]ntil the South
Carolina Supreme Court speaks affirmatively on the subject of
strict liability, this court will continue to follow its decision...
that such a rule is not applicable in [South Carolina].""
The approach the Fifth Circuit adopted under similar cir-
cumstances appears more logical. In Putnam v. Erie City Manu-
facturing Co.," the court anticipated the Texas Supreme Court
position in the area of products liability. In considering the "Erie
problem," the court adopted the following policy:
The court is forced . . . to look to "all available data," for
example, "to such sources as the Restatements of Law, treatises
and law review commentary, and the majority rule," keeping in
mind that it must "choose the rule which it believes the state
court, from all that is known about its methods of reaching
decisions is likely in the future to adopt (citations omitted). '
The Putnam court, although concerned with the abolition of the
privity requirement, considered that issue determinative of the
application of strict tort liability. In view of the Springfield deci-
sion and the legislative abolition of privity through the adoption
of a liberal version of section 2-318 of the UCC, the Putnam
39. Bass v. Harbor Light Marina, Inc., Civil No. 73-1301 (D.S.C., filed Dec. 17, 1973)
(Judge Hemphill) and Brown v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Civil No. 72-782 (D.S.C.,
filed Dec. 13, 1973) (Judge Simons).
40. Civil No. 72-782 (D.S.C., filed Dec. 13, 1973).
41. Id. at 11.
42. Civil No. 73-1567 (D.S.C., filed Jan. 31, 1974).
43. Id. at 17.
44. 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
45. Id. at 917.
1974]
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approach should be definitively adopted by the Fourth Circuit in
order to eliminate any question as to the applicability of the
doctrine of strict tort liability in South Carolina.t
H. NEGLIGENCE, PROXIMATE CAUSE AND CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE
The South Carolina Supreme Court during 1973 considered
and came to opposite conclusions in two very similar cases involv-
ing the jury's function as it relates to negligence, proximate cause
and contributory negligence. Wilson v. Marshall"5 and Odom v.
Steigerwald47 involved actions to recover the damages for personal
injuries sustained in intersectional automobile collisions. Accord-
ing to the uncontradicted evidence, the defendant's testate in
Wilson failed to stop her automobile at an intersection, driving
directly into the path of the plaintiffs automobile, which was
traveling on the dominant highway. Similarly, in Odom the de-
fendant allegedly failed to yield the right of way as he drove his
automobile from a side street into the street on which the plaintiff
was traveling. In both instances, the defendants asserted contri-
butory negligence as a bar to plaintiffs' recovery, such assertions
being based primarily on allegations that plaintiffs were driving
at excessive rates of speed and that they failed to keep a proper
lookout.
In Wilson, the supreme court found the existence of a viable
jury issue and thus reversed the trial court's grant of plaintiffs
motion for directed verdict. Conversely, the court in Odom re-
versed the trial court's refusal to grant plaintiff's motion for di-
rected verdict." An examination of the facts in Wilson and Odom
is not particularly helpful in reconciling the two cases, but a
review of the decisions in light of Horton v. Greyhound Corp.49 is
valuable in analyzing the court's approach. In Horton, the su-
preme court affirmed the grant of a directed verdict for the defen-
dant on the issue of liability. In that case, a collision occurred
when a truck in which the plaintiff was a passenger drove around
a vehicle which was stopped to make a left turn, and crossed the
t See page 361 for note on 1974 legislative adoption of section 402A strict liability.
46. 260 S.C. 271, 195 S.E.2d 610 (1973).
47. 260 S.C. 422, 196 S.E.2d 635 (1973).
48, It is an elementary proposition of law that, in ruling on plaintiff's motion for
directed verdict, the court must view the evidence and all its reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the defendant. 260 S.C. at 274, 195 S.E.2d at 611.
49. 241 S.C. 430, 128 S.E.2d 776 (1963).
[Vol. 26
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centerline into the path of a bus owned by defendant. Even
though the evidence presented a jury issue as to the excessive
speed of the defendant's bus, the court found no evidence from
which a reasonable inference could be drawn that such excessive
speed was a proximate cause of the collision. The efficient cause
of the collision was found to be the truck driver's turning his
vehicle into the lane in which the bus was traveling. The court
held that "[t]he concurrence of excessive speed with this pri-
mary, efficient cause of the collision does not impose liability
unless, without it, the collision would not have occurred."5
Because the bus had a right to occupy the lane in which it
was traveling, there was no legal significance in the fact that
"speed was a contributing factor in placing the bus at a particular
location on the highway when the emergency arose .... .", The
bus driver was required to operate the bus at a reasonably pru-
dent speed, but he was not required to drive at such a speed as
to avoid a collision in the event of the unlawful act of the truck
driver. The court thus held that liability of the defendant was
contingent upon the existence of a causal connection between the
excessive speed of the bus and the collision. "Some evidence that
if the bus had been operated at a reasonable speed it could have
been stopped at some distance short of the collision point is re-
quired to support . . . an inference [of causal connection.]"5 In
Horton the court found no such evidence and required a directed
verdict for the defendant.
The court in Wilson, confronted with a similar situation.,
reversed the trial court's grant of a directed verdict for the plain-
tiff. According to the court, the evidence left absolutely no doubt
as to the negligence of the defendant and, furthermore, indicated
that the defendant might be guilty of willful and reckless con-
duct. Nevertheless, it concluded that there was also a reasonable
inference of contributory negligence in plaintiff's failure to exer-
cise due care in keeping a proper lookout and in driving at an
appropriate speed. Although the court in Wilson stated without
explanation that Horton was distinguishable on its facts, the dis-
50. Id. at 439, 128 S.E.2d at 781.
51. Id. The court considered the Horton case a very unusual set of circumstances. It
stated that "[tihis is simply one of those rare cases in which the evidence, although
sufficient to support an inference of concurrent negligence by the defendants, is insuffi-
cient to support a reasonable inference that without such negligence the collision would
not have occurred." Id. at 441, 128 S.E.2d at 782.
52. Id. at 440, 128 S.E.2d at 782.
1974]
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tinction appears to be only one of degree. While the court in
Horton determined that the evidence was susceptible of a reason-
able inference of negligence but not of proximate cause, it held
in Wilson that there existed sufficient evidence to warrant the
inference that plaintiff's speed was not only negligently excessive
but also a contributing proximate cause of the collision. The court
found evidence to suggest that but for plaintiffs failure to keep
a proper lookout and drive at an appropriate speed, the collision
might have been avoided.
Dismissed rather summarily by the Wilson court was the
right of the plaintiff to assume that the defendant would stop at
the intersection in compliance with the law.53 Certainly one can-
not take issue with the court's statement that "one has the right,
in the absence of anything to reasonably put one on notice to the
contrary, to assume that others will proceed with due care in
accordance with the law."54 The problem arises in determining
when one should be charged with "notice to the contrary." The
court imposed on the plaintiff a rather demanding standard of
anticipation in finding that, by looking, the plaintiff would have
been put on notice that the defendant's testate "was most proba-
bly not going to stop."55 The court thus found evidence to support
a finding of contributory negligence by finding that the plaintiff
could possibly have avoided the collision. Had the plaintiff not
been held to such an exacting standard, the court might have
found, as in Horton, the absence of evidence to indicate that
plaintiffs negligence was a contributing proximate cause.
In Odom, the defendant asserted that plaintiffs excessive
speed was the "proximate concurring cause of the collision."5 In
examining the nature of the relationship between negligence,
proximate cause and contributory negligence, the court ex-
plained, consistently with Horton and Clyde v. Southern Public
Utilities Co. , that" . . before the negligence of a plaintiff will
defeat recovery, it must be made to appear that such negligence
contributed to the injury as a proximate cause."58
53. The proposition that one has the right to proceed on the assumption that others
will act lawfully was discussed with no apparent resolution in Still v. Blake, 255 S.C. 95,
177 S.E.2d 469 (1970). It is simply one factor to be weighed by the jury.
54. 260 S.C. at 276, 195 S.E.2d at 612.
55. Id. at 277, 195 S.E.2d at 613.
56. 260 S.C. at 426, 196 S.E.2d at 637.
57. 109 S.C. 290, 96 S.E. 116 (1918).
58. 260 S.C. at 426, 427, 196 S.E.2d at 637.
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In clarification of its view of the nature of proximate cause,
the court quoted with approval from the 1909 case of Bodie v.
Railway Co. :
A want of ordinary care may be said to contribute proximately
to an injury when it is an active and efficient cause of the injury
in any degree, however slight, and not the mere condition or
occasion of it. But it is not a proximate cause of injury when the
negligence of the person inflicting it is a more immediate, effi-
cient cause."
The court in Bodie asserted that the distinction must be recog-
nized "between contributory negligence and negligence which
contributes remotely or merely furnishes a condition for its inflic-
tion." However, the court further explained that the negligence
of an injured party will not be considered contributory negligence
if the one inflicting the injury could have avoided the accident by
the exercise of ordinary care. Conversely, if the negligence of the
one inflicting the injury precedes the negligence of the injured
party and the latter might have avoided the injury by the exercise
of ordinary care, the conduct of the person injured is considered
a direct and proximate cause of the injury.
The court in Odom, even assuming excessive speed and
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, determined as a matter of
law that the plaintiff's conduct was not a contributing proximate
cause. To the contrary, it found that "[t]he real cause, the more
immediate and efficient cause, was the improper driving conduct
of [the defendant] . ' 62 To reach such a conclusion in light of
Horton, Wilson, and Bodie, the court must have found the exist-
ence of evidence from which it could be inferred that the
defendant's negligence would have resulted in the collision re-
gardless of the plaintiff's conduct. Although there exists in -the
decisions a thread of logical consistency, it is extremely difficult
to reconcile the results reached in Odom and Wilson. As Justice
Bussey indicates in his dissent in Odom, it is a rather interesting
exercise of imagination to fathom how the court in Wilson found
sufficient evidence to require submission of the issue of contribu-
tory negligence to the jury without doing so in Odom. The latter
case appears to be the more compelling fact situation for such a
59. 61 S.C. 468, 39 S.E. 715 (1901).
60. 260 S.C. at 427, 196 S.E.2d at 637.
61. 61 S.C. at 484, 39 S.E. at 720.
62. 260 S.C. at 428, 196 S.E.2d at 639.
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conclusion. Justice Bussey, who wrote the majority opinion in
Wilson, asserted in his dissent that the court in Odom reversed
the trial judge for doing what in Wilson the court held the trial
judge should have done. 3 Horton, an often-cited case, would
seem to allow submission to the jury only if some evidence were
presented to indicate that the collisions could have been avoided
had the plaintiffs exercised due care. Such evidence appears to
have been present both in Wilson and in Odom.
III. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Charitable Immunity
The doctrine of charitable immunity, which was once ad-
hered to consistently throughout the United States, has now been
totally rejected by the vast majority of the states. 4 Even in the
jurisdictions which purport to retain the doctrine in varying de-
grees, many exceptions and limitations have generally been rec-
ognized. 5 In South Carolina, the initial judicial recognition of
charitable immunity appeared in Lindler v. Columbia Hospital,"
a case involving the negligence of a nurse employed by an
eleemosynary hospital. The court explained the basis of its deci-
sion in the following manner: "The true ground upon which to
rest the exemption of liability is that it would be against public
policy to hold a charitable institution responsible for the negli-
gence of its servants, selected with due care." 7 The court care-
fully indicated the limited nature of its holding by asserting that
the liability of a charitable institution for negligence in selecting
servants was not an issue before the court. The position that
eleemosynary institutions are exempt from liability for the negli-
gent conduct of their agents was subsequently reaffirmed in
63. Justice Bussey's dissent rests largely on the conviction that the facts could rea-
sonably be interpreted by a jury in such a manner as to find the plaintiff's speeding a
proximate cause of the collision, and thus, of her injuries.
64. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 133 nn. 68 & 69 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter
PROSSER). As of the date of publication of PROSSER the doctrine was rapidly being abro-
gated in the jurisdictions in which the issue arose, but the list of jurisdictions which had
completely abolished the doctrine included: Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada (statute), New Hampshire,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
65. See generally PROSSER § 133 at 995.
66. 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1912).
67. Id. at 28, 81 S.E. at 513. See generally PROSSER § 133 at 993.
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Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West;68 and the rule
adopted in Lindler and Vermillion was applied in Decker v.
Bishop of Charleston.9 However, the South Carolina Supreme
Court denied to charitable institutions exemptions from liability
in two other cases because of the nature of the activity from which
the conduct arose. The first of these was Peden v. Furman
University,70 in which the court refused to extend immunity to a
charitable institution in an action involving trespass and nuis-
ance. In Eiserhardt v. State Agricultural & Mechanical Society,1
the court determined that immunity from liability would not be
extended in a situation where the activity giving rise to the liabil-
ity was primarily commercial in nature and unrelated to the char-
itable purpose of the institution.
In the recent case of Jeff coat v. Caine," the South Carolina
Supreme Court took another step in enervating the now-
outmoded doctrine of charitable immunity. The court in Jeffcoat
acknowledged the decisions in the previous charitable immunity
cases and explained that the broad references to generally com-
plete exemption from tort liability was "unnecessary to a decision
in those cases, and the rule of charitable immunity has never
been extended beyond the facts in Lindler, Vermillion, and
Decker."7 3 The Jeffcoat case involved an allegation of false im-
prisonment by employees of the South Carolina Baptist Hospital.
The plaintiff appealed the order of the lower court granting sum-
mary judgment on the basis of charitable immunity. In a decision
which recognized the increasing criticism of the doctrine,74 the
court asserted that neither "reason and justice" nor precedent
required the application of the doctrine in the case of an inten-
tional tort.75 Given the facts in Jeffcoat, the court was compelled
to go no further in order to effect denial of charitable immunity
to the hospital. It did, nonetheless, indicate the skepticism with
68. 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916). The court found, however, that charitable
immunity applied regardless of whether agents were selected with due care. The case was
remanded for a new trial, and upon appeal after a re-trial, judgment for the defendant
was affirmed.
69. 247 S.C. 317, 147 S.E.2d 264 (1966).
70. 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907 (1930).
71. 235 S.C. 305, 111 S.E.2d 568 (1959),
72. 261 S.C. 75, 198 S.E.2d 258 (1973).
73. Id.
74. The modern trend in many areas of the law is toward equitable risk distribution,
which can now readily be accomplished through the purchase of liability insurance.
75. 261 S.C. at 80, 198 S.E.2d at 260.
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which it views the continued vitality of the doctrine in South
Carolina, even when involving mere negligence. The generally
negative attitude of the court toward charitable immunity is il-
lustrated by the following quote from its opinion:
Regardless of the public policy support, if there now be such, for
a rule exempting a charity from liability for simple negligence,
we know of no public policy. . . which would require the ex-
emption . . . from liability for an intentional tort .... 1'
It appears that, given the appropriate factual situation, the South
Carolina Supreme Court will follow the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions and completely abolish the doctrine of charitable
immunity.
B. Unfair Competition and Service Mark Infringement
The case of Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn7 was an action
in equity instituted by the Holiday Inns of America [hereinafter
called the Chain] claiming unfair competition and service mark
infringement. The defendant counter-claimed alleging, inter alia,
unfair competition and service mark infringement by the plain-
tiff."5 The defendant, a locally-owned Myrtle Beach motel, ac-
quired the name "Holiday Inn" in 1949 and was incorporated in
1960. The plaintiff Chain was incorporated in 1952 and is now the
largest motel chain in the United States. In 1956, a chain fran-
chisee who was constructing a motel in Myrtle Beach received
objections from the defendant to the proposed use of the name
"Holiday Inn" within the area. In response the plaintiff's fran-
chisee obtained permission from the Chain to operate within its
system under the name "Holiday Lodge". A subsequently con-
structed facility was also franchised, under the name "Holiday
Downtown."79
The court determined that the defendant was guilty of both
unfair competition and service mark infringement. It found that
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. 364 F. Supp. 775 (D.S.C. 1973). Federal diversity jurisdiction was invoked be-
cause the plaintiff is a Tennessee corporation and the defendant is a South Carolina
corporation.
78. In addition, the defendant alleged false representation and designation of origin
by the plaintiff and sought cancellation of certain trademark registrations. Since the court
considered these issues of minimal importance, they will not be discussed in this article.
79. Discussion is omitted of the aspect of the case relating to the Holiday Inn North
Myrtle Beach, considered by the court to be in a different geographic area, and the
Holiday Inn Trav-L-Park, a different type facility.
[Vol. 26
15
Beckham: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons,
TORTS
the defendant willfully and deliberately" attempted to capitalize
on the goodwill of the nationally-recognized chain by the follow-
ing acts: erecting a sign that was almost indistinguishable from
that employed by the Chain, utilizing a script to present its name
which was essentially identical to that which had been registered
by the plaintiff, and adopting a slogan very similar to that of the
Chain.8 As the court recognized, the defendant by his actions was
violating important property rights of the plaintiff which are enti-
tled to broad protection. 2
Relying on the traditional doctrine that one seeking relief in
equity may not do so with "unclean hands," the court refused to
grant the defendant's counterclaim for relief, which was based on
the fact that he was the prior user of the name "Holiday Inn" in
Myrtle Beach.83 The court also determined that the plaintiff was
not estopped from bringing suit because it had remained silent
even though it had knowledge of defendant's conduct. A Fourth
Circuit decision was cited by the court in which it had been
unequivocally stated that:
It is settled that mere delay in seeking relief is no bar to an
injunction when the infringer has had knowledge of the fact that
he is infringing and has deliberately set out to capitalize on the
goodwill of the owner."
According to the district court, the test for trademark in-
fringement is whether the use of the alleged copy or close approxi-
mation of the registered mark is likely to cause confusion or mis-
take and to deceive the public.85 "The test is to be applied with
regard to the effect of the marks on an ordinary purchaser having
an indefinite recollection of the mark to which he has been ex-
80. It was noted by the court, however, that intent is not a requisite element of these
causes of action.
81. The Chain's slogan is "Your host from coast to coast." The defendants' slogans
were "Your host on the coast" and "Your host while at Myrtle Beach." The court noted
that these slogans alone would not have constituted an infringement, but they did when
taken in conjunction with the other acts of the defendant.
82. 364 F. Supp. at 783.
83. The court in reaching this conclusion also relied on the RESTATEMENT OF
ToRrs § 749 (1938). This section provides that one is barred from recovery against an-
other who would otherwise be liable to him if "in his trade-mark or trade name . . . [he]
. ..habitually makes misrepresentations about himself or his goods, services or business
on matters of substantial importance . .."
84. 364 F. Supp. at 784, quoting Rothman v. Greyhound Corp., 175 F.2d 893, 895 (4th
Cir. 1949).
85. This test is enunciated in 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1970).
86. 364 F. Supp. at 782.
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posed on a previous occasion."86 The court concluded that the
defendant's actions had quite clearly resulted in such confusion,
mistake or deception in the minds of the general public, and that
the situation would be further aggravated if the Chain franchisee
were allowed to adopt the name "Holiday Inn" in the immediate
area. Asserting its responsibility to protect the rights of the trav-
eling public, the court determined that equity required that the
defendant be enjoined from its acts of unfair competition and
trademark infringement, but that it should be allowed to con-
tinue using the name "Holiday Inn" in the Myrtle Beach area. It
further concluded that protection of the public also required the
plaintiff's franchisee to continue to operate his facilities under the
names Holiday Lodge and Holiday Downtown."'
C. Negligent Entrustment of Dangerous Instrumentality
The plaintiffs in Howell v. Hairston88 instituted an action to
recover medical expenses incurred by their son as a result of his
being shot in the eye by the son of the defendants. The primary
issue under consideration was whether the trial judge erred in
granting defendant's motion for nonsuit. The South Carolina
Supreme Court decided that its affirmative answer to that ques-
tion required it to resolve other issues" which might arise during
the new trial, including the correctness of the trial court's striking
from the complaint the allegation that an air rifle is a dangerous
instrumentality.
In considering whether the defendant was entitled to a non-
suit, the court examined the facts to ascertain whether a jury
issue as to negligence of the defendants had been presented. It is
the generally accepted rule that, in the absence of a statute pro-
viding to the contrary," a parent is not vicariously liable for the
conduct of this child.' Liability may, however, be established in
appropriate circumstances on the basis of negligent entrustment.
As the Howell court stated, "[1liability for injuries inflicted by
a minor with a gun may be predicated on the fact that the parents
permitted the minor to have the gun, knowing the minor was of
87. Prior to trial all parties waived monetary damages.
88. 199 S.E.2d 776 (S.C. 1973).
89. The other issue under consideration was an evidential problem involving the
admissibility of plaintiffs testimony that the defendants paid them $100 in partial pay-
ment of their son's medical expenses.
90. There is apparently no South Carolina statute on this point.
91. See PROSSER § 123 at 871.
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a reckless or malignant disposition.""2 In this initial judicial con-
sideration of the question in South Carolina, the court concluded
that specific proof of the parents' knowledge of their child's mali-
cious disposition was not required; but that they were chargeable
with notice of such disposition if it was part of his general reputa-
tion. The court found a reasonable inference that the defendants
"failed to act as reasonably prudent parents under the circum-
stances,"93 and thus granted the plaintiff a new trial.
The next issue considered was the correctness of the trial
judge's action in striking the plaintiffs allegation that the air rifle
was a dangerous instrumentality. Whether the air rifle is classi-
fied as a dangerous instrumentality, though not determinative, is
clearly relevant on the issue of entrustment. The lack of judicial
authority in South Carolina concerning the characterization of an
air rifle as a dangerous instrumentality imposed upon the court
the necessity of forging a rule applicable in this state." In doing
so, it adopted a logical, commonsensical approach. The court
refused to categorically classify an air rifle as a dangerous instru-
mentality, but instead stated that "[m]any instrumentalities
are dangerous or not dangerous because of their use or potential
use under the circumstances."95 It held that since "a jury could
reasonably conclude that an air rifle was a dangerous instrumen-
tality under the conditions alleged,"96 the trial judge erred in
striking the allegation from the complaint.
Significantly, the court emphasized that its holding was
based on the theory that an air rifle is not per se a dangerous
instrumentality, but is potentially so, and that it was negligently
entrusted to one incapable of appreciating the danger. It explic-
itly held that one is liable for damages resulting from negligently
entrusting a dangerous instrumentality to another, while he is not
ordinarily considered negligent for entrustment of a non-
dangerous instrumentality.
D. Tort Liability Through Agency Relationship
The South Carolina Supreme Court was faced with an inter-
esting question of liability based upon traditional agency princi-
92. 199 S.E.2d at 768; see also Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 793 (1959).
93. 199 S.E.2d at 769.
94. The court found the decisions in other jurisdictions to be conflicting.
95. 199 S.E.2d at 770.
96. Id.
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ples in Collins v. Smith." The court reversed and remanded the
case, in which a verdict of $125,000 actual damages for the death
of plaintiff's intestate had been rendered in the lower court. The
accident causing the death occurred when the automobile in
which plaintiff's intestate was riding collided with a truck owned
by the defendant, Collins Brothers Grain Company, and driven
by the defendant farmer. The farmer had sold the corn to the
grain company and was in the process of delivering it to them.
Collins, who was in the business of buying and selling grain,
customarily furnished trucks for customers to use in transporting
the grain to their places of business.
In considering the liability of Collins," the court stated that
a prima facie case of master and servant was established by the
proof that the truck was being used in accord with the agreement
between the farmer and Collins." The denial by both defendants
of the existence of an agency relationship, even when not contra-
dicted by direct evidence, was not sufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption of agency. Accordingly, the supreme court upheld the
trial court's refusal to grant a directed verdict for defendants as
to that issue.
The supreme court determined, however, that prejudicial
error was committed by the trial judge's failure to give the jury a
"legal yardstick"' to determine what constitutes the relation-
ship of "principal and agent" or "master and servant." An essen-
tial element of agency which should have been explained to the
jury by an appropriate charge was that of control. The court held
that the specific elements of the particular relationship must be
charged to the jury; a verdict will not be allowed to stand when
the jury's conception of agency rests solely upon a presumption
arising from one's use of another's vehicle, as in this case.
97. 200 S.E.2d 71 (S.C. 1973).
98. The liability of the defendant farmer was not considered on appeal. However, the
supreme court reversed and remanded as to him on the basis that it could not allow such
a large verdict to stand against one of the defendants while reversing as to the other. For
the rationale of the court, see 200 S.E.2d at 73-74.
99. In support of this proposition, the court cited: Keen v. Army Cycle Mfg. Co., 124
S.C. 342, 117 S.E. 53 (1923); Watson v. Kennedy, 180 S.C. 543, 186 S.E. 549 (1936); Norris
v. Bryant, 217 S.C. 389, 60 S.E.2d 844 (1950). 200 S.E.2d at 73.
100. 200 S.E.2d at 73.
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E. Guest Statute °1'
In the case of Edens v. Cole,102 the South Carolina Supreme
Court was given the opportunity to examine the application of the
guest statute,0 3 and the appropriateness of a directed verdict for
the plaintiff in the absence of contradictory testimony by the
defendant. The decision of the court appears in both respects to
have been logically sound as well as necessary in order to avoid
potentially collusive lawsuits. At the time of the incident giving
rise to plaintiff's alleged injuries, she, her husband and children
were traveling with defendant in his automobile to visit relatives
of plaintiff's husband. The injuries allegedly occurred as a result
of the plaintiffs being thrown to the floor of the automobile when
the defendant swerved to avoid striking a dog. At the trial, as well
as in a prior deposition, the plaintiff testified that the defendant
was driving at an excessive and reckless rate of speed and had
refused to heed her cautionary remarks. 04
The plaintiff contended that she was entitled to a directed
verdict because the defendant placed no witnesses on the stand
and the appellant's testimony was thus uncontradicted. The
court, however, concluded that the lack of direct contradictory
evidence did not place a "stamp of verity"15 upon plaintiff's testi-
mony. The court asserted that it was the function of the jury to
determine the credibility of her testimony, "taking into consider-
ation her interest in the result, the accuracy of her recollection,
and all of the circumstances tending to impeach her as a witness
and discredit her testimony."'0 6
Error was also asserted by the appellant in the charging of
the guest statute'0' by the trial judge. It was the decision of the
101. It is interesting to note that in California a challenge to the constitutionality of
the guest statute was upheld. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr.
388 (1973).
102. 201 S.E.2d 382 (S.C. 1973).
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962). The pertinent text reads as follows:
No person transported by an owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for
damages against such motor vehicle or its owner or operator for injury, death or
loss in case of an accident unless such accident shall have been intentional on
the part of such owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless
disregard of the rights of others.
104. This testimony appears inconsistent with a written statement signed by appel-
lant, in which there was no mention of respondent's driving at an excessive rate of speed
or of appellant's cautioning him.
105. 201 S.E.2d at 386.
106. 201 S.E.2d at 386, citing Jackson v. Jackson, 234 S.C. 291, 108 S.E.2d 86 (1959).
107. See note 102 supra.
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court, in accord with the generally accepted rule in such cases,' 8
that the guest statute was appropriate. The fact that the plain-
tiff's husband paid for having the automobile serviced before
leaving on the trip did not alter his guest status. This is so be-
cause "the primary purpose of the trip was social in nature,"',"
and the invitation was not "motivated by, or conditioned on,""'
the sharing of costs by the appellant's husband. Nevertheless, it
appears implicit in the court's decision that evidence of some
express prearrangement between two parties for sharing expenses
might, in some situations, be an important factor in relieving an
individual of his or her status as a guest within the meaning of
the statute.
F. Civil Rights Act: "Under Color of State Law"
In the case of Scott v. Vandiver,"2 a county sheriff and
county supervisor appealed from a decision holding them person-
ally liable for injuries resulting from an assault against Scott by
two county employees. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed as
to the sheriff but reversed as to the supervisor on the basis of
common agency principles. The determination was made that the
supervisor was no longer responsible for the employees' conduct
because they were performing tasks outside the normal scope of
their employment and the sheriff alone had assumed the respon-
sibility of supervising the men.
The facts of this case present an interesting but appalling
situation. A shooting was reported to the sheriff, who, pursuant
to custom, enlisted the assistance of two county employees in the
investigation. The two men stopped Scott near the scene of the
reported shooting and, without identifying themselves, ordered
him to get into their truck to be taken to the sheriff. Seeing a gun
on the seat of the truck, Scott fled. One of the men fired his gun
108. See generally 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 399.11(b) (1969); Annot., 39
A.L.R.3d 1224 (1971).
109. 201 S.E.2d at 387.
110. Id.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
112. 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973).
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toward the respondent, who fell while fleeing and severely injured
his shoulder.
Scott instituted a section 1983 action against the sheriff and
county supervisor as the individuals responsible for the behavior
of the two county employees. The Circuit Court of Appeals recog-
nized that the record negated the defenses of good faith and prob-
able cause which may, if appropriate, be asserted in section 1983
actions.' The main issue involved was whether the actions of the
two assailants could be classified as being "under color of state
law." The court experienced little difficulty in coming to the
conclusion that either under section 53-199 of the 1962 South
Carolina Code"' as it supplements the common law, or under the
theory that "custom may support a section 1983 claim if it has
'the force of law,' " the assault was made "under color of state
law." "Here the sheriff's common law powers to summon by-
standers infused his custom of using county employees in man-
hunts with the force of law.
11 5
Once the determination had been made that a section 1983
action was appropriate, the second problem to be considered was
the liability in South Carolina of a sheriff for the acts of his
subordinates."6 The supreme court of this state has imposed lia-
bility upon a sheriff for the acts of a deputy committed in his
capacity as a representative of the sheriff.' A sheriff is responsi-
ble not only for the acts and errors of his deputies, but also for
the acts of "all persons acting under him in every subordinate
capacity."' 18 The court in Scott determined that the two county
employees acting temporarily as law enforcement officers would
be included within the above category. The imposition of such
liability for actions of subordinates may encourage sheriffs and
other officials to select discriminately and train carefully those to
whom they delegate authority.
113. In support of this assertion, the court cited: Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967);
Hill v. Rowland, 474 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1973).
114. This statute authorizes a deputy sheriff to summon a posse comitatus to aid in
the arrest of those suspected of violating the law. 476 F.2d at 241.
115. 476 F.2d at 241.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970); see also 476 F.2d at 242 for collection of cases
illustrating application of state law in section 1983 actions.
117. See Rutledge v. Small, 192 S.C. 254, 63 S.E.2d 260 (1939).
118. Teasdale v. Hart, 2 Bay 173, 175 (S.C. 1798). The holding of this case was
reaffirmed in Rutledge.
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G. Federal Tort Claims Actt'9
S. Schonfeld Co., Inc. v. S.S. Akra Tenaron 21 involved an
action against the United States and a Pure Food and Drug
Administration inspector for the alleged negligent handling of a
cargo of canned tomatoes after its lawful detention. The United
States moved for dismissal or summary judgment, asserting that
recovery for damages resulting from the negligent action of the
government agent was barred by two exceptions to the Federal
Tort Claims Act.121 The government's first contention was based
on section 2680(a), a provision which precludes government lia-
bility resulting from the performance of discretionary duties by a
government agency or employee, even if the discretion is
abused.'12 The district court summarily rejected this government
defense, noting that "once the government has exercised its dis-
cretion and has decided to proceed in a matter, then [it] is liable
for negligent acts done in the course of such proceedings.'
'2
The government prevailed with its second contention-that
this action was barred by section 2680(c), the exception to the Act
for "[any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection
of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or
merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law
enforcement officer." 2 4 The plaintiff relies primarily upon
Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States,2' a Second Circuit case
involving a cargo of goods which disappeared from the "Public
Stores" where it had been placed for inspection by customs'offi-
cials. The Alliance court held that section 2680(c) was designed
to prevent liability for unlawful seizures, and it does not preclude
government liability when goods which have been detained disap-
pear entirely. Although the result reached seems equitable, it
does not appear to be an accurate interpretation of the legislative
intent as expressed in the Federal Tort Claims Act. The fact that
119, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1970). This act is a limited waiver of sovereign immu-
nity.
120, 363 F. Supp. 1220 (D.S.C. 1973).
121. The exceptions to the act are found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970).
122. According to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970), the provisions of the Federal Tort
Claims Act are inapplicable to "[any claim based upon the performance, or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
123. 363 F. Supp. at 1221. A good discussion of this doctrine may be found in Hernan-
dez v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 369 (D. Hawaii 1953).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1970).
125. 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958).
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the language of the statute specifically bars "any claim" arising
out of the detention of goods was a major reason that the
Schonfeld court could not accept the logic of the Alliance deci-
sion. The court could find "nothing in the language of the statute
to indicate that erroneous seizure in the inception should he dis-
tinguished from improper retention or negligent handling of goods
properly seized at the outset.1' 26 In addition, the Schonfeld court
noted that the Alliance decision appears to be unique in allowing
government liability in a case involving the detention of goods by
customs officials.'" The court cited with approval a Seventh Cir-
cuit decision' 21 which held that section 2680(c) prohibited a suit
based on the negligent storage of merchandise by an FDA agent,
and found that case to be factually indistinguishable from the
present case.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Schonfeld is the
court's indication in a footnote that there might have been a
cause of action against the government or its agent under the
Tucker Act'' for breach of an implied contract of bailment. The
court noted that the Tucker Act had been an alternative basis for
liability in Alliance, and then stated further that "[t]he plaintiff
here makes no reference to the act, apparently willing for its cause
to stand or fall on the Tort Claims theory."'3
H. Malfunctioning Traffic Light-Waiver of Sovereign Immun-
ity,3,
The question of a city's liability for injuries arising from a
126. 363 F. Supp. at 1223. The Alliance court avoided the provisions of the Act by
stating that § 2680(c) applied only to actions or omissions during the process of detention,
but not to such acts or omissions after a lawful seizure had been made.
127. Id.
128. United States v. 1500 Cases, 249 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1957).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970).
130. 363 F. Supp. at 1222, n.2.
131. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, although still intact in this state with the
exception of a few specific statutory waivers, is being abolished in a rapidly increasing
number of jurisdictions. For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the development
of governmental immunity, the current status of the doctrine throughout the United
States, and the policy reasons for abolishing it, see Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public
Education, 305 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973). The Ayala court compiled a list illustrating the status
of sovereign immunity in various jurisdictions from material presented in the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 895A at 12-20 (Tentative Draft, Mar. 30, 1973).
Among the jurisdictions which have judicially abolished governmental immunity are
the following: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and District of Columbia.
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collision which occurred as a result of a malfunctioning traffic
light was considered by the South Carolina Supreme Court in two
1973 cases.' 2 The court determined that a malfunctioning traffic
light constitutes a defect within the meaning of section 47-70 of
the 1962 South Carolina Code.' This provision waives sovereign
immunity and allows recovery against a municipality for injuries
resulting from a defect in a street. The well-established general
rule was cited that:
A defect in a highway, within the meaning of the statute, is any
physical condition of the improved portion thereof, or the exist-
ence of such condition on or overhanging the right of way, which
makes the use of the improved portion of the highway unsafe
and dangerous to a traveler exercising due care.'34
I. Statutory Violation as Negligence per se
A violation of the Pure Food and Drug Act 35 was at issue in
the case of Cummins v. Dorchester Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 3 Suf-
ficient evidence existed to show that a Coca-Cola contained dele-
terious matter upon leaving defendant's hands and that the swal-
lowing of this adulterated material was the proximate cause of
plaintiff's illness. Nevertheless, the trial court verdict was for the
defendant. The supreme court reversed. The court held that the
trial judge had properly instructed the jury that violation of the
Act was negligence per se. He erred, however, in also instructing
them that in order to find for the plaintiff, the jury must find that
the deleterious matter was in the Coca-Cola due to the actual
negligence and carelessness of the defendant. These two charges
are inherently contradictory. In Cummins, the supreme court of
The following states have statutorily abolished the doctrine: Hawaii, Iowa, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.
Other states have adopted a theory that immunity is waived to the extent of insurance
coverage. Included in this list are: Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
132. Fox v. City of Columbia, 260 S.C. 367, 196 S.E.2d 105 (1973); Gazoo v. City of
Columbia, 260 S.C. 371, 196 S.E.2d 106 (1973).
133. This section provides that:
[any person who shall receive bodily injury or damages in his person or prop-
erty through a defect in any street, causeway, bridge or public way or by reason
of a defect or mismanagement of anything under the control of the corporation
• . . may recover in an action against such city or town ....
134. 260 S.C. at 370, 371, 196 S.E.2d at 105, quoting Stanley v. South Carolina
Highway Dep't, 249 S.C. 230, 235, 153 S.E.2d 687, 689 (1967).
135. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1511 et. seq. (1962).
136. 260 S.C. 51, 194 S.E.2d 185 (1973).
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this state adopted the majority view that a violation of the Act
constitutes negligence per se,'17 entitling the plaintiff to recover
if such violation is the proximate cause of his injury.' 8
J. Recovery Under Unidentified Motorist Provision
Under the provisions of sections 46-750.34 and 46-750.35 of
the 1962 South Carolina Code, as amended, a plaintiff may re-
cover for damages sustained in an accident with an unidentified
driver of a motor vehicle. An action for recovery under those
provisions was considered by the South Carolina Supreme Court
in the case of Hart v. Doe,'3' an appeal from a judgment non
obstante veredicto against the plaintiff. The court affirmed the
trial judge's determination that, because the evidence was sus-
ceptible of only one reasonable inference, no jury issue was pre-
sented. It was apparent from the evidence that the plaintiff made
no effort to ascertain the identity of the other driver, although she
was able and had the opportunity to do so. As a prerequisite to a
right of recovery under section 46-750.34, the plaintiff must
"prove by a preponderance of evidence that her injury was caused
by a physical contact with the unknown vehicle and that she was
not negligent in failing to determine the identity of the other
vehicle and the driver thereof."''
ELAINE H. BECKHAM
137. For a discussion of statutory violations constituting negligence per se see W.
PROSSER, THE LAW Op TORTS § 36 at 200 (4th ed. 1971).
138. Accordingly, a plaintiff in such an action is not required to prove negligence in
fact by the defendant.
139. 198 S.E.2d 526 (S.C. 1973).
140. Id. at 528.
Addendum
The discussion on the status of strict liability in this state has been rendered moot by the
recent South Carolina legislative adoption of section 402A strict liability, which became
effective on July 9, 1974 (Rat. no. 1338). The legislature adopted the language of Restate-
ment (Second) Section 402A (see note 9 supra) and added the following two sections:
(1) If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured
by it, he is barred from recovery.
(2) Comments to Section 402 A of the Restatement of Torts, Second, are
incorporated herein by reference thereto as the legislative intent of this act.
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